CYPRUS PROBLEM SOLUTION PROSPECTS

(July 1997)

HOW TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION

TO THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S LATEST RESOLUTION

In its latest resolution 1117 of June 26,1997, the Security Council(S.C.) "reiterated grave concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded,upgraded and modernised, including by the introduction of Sophisticated weapons",and for the SEVENTH time in the last 5 years (1993-1997) it called upon all concerned "to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending and a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S24472, annex)".

Furthermore, the S.C."deeply regretted the fact that, in spite of the efforts of the UNFICYP, neither side has so far accepted the reciprocal measures for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines proposed by UNFICYP and reiterated its call on on both sides to do so without delay or preconditions " and also "called upon them to create a climate for reconciliation and genuine mutual confidence on both sides and to avoid any actions which might increase tension "

It is to be regretted that neither side has complied with these insistent demands by the S.C., in spite of the obligation of all U.N. Members, under article 25 of the Charter, "to accept and carry out the decisions of the S.C.".

THE S.G'S LETTERS TO THE TWO LEADERS IN CYPRUS\

Soon after he took office in January 1997, the new U.N. Secretary General (S.G.) Mr. Kofi Annan, wrote to the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, and, among other things, stressed the following points:

"The Cyprus problem has been at an impasse for too long. Recent developments have again underlined how precarious is the status quo. To allow it to continue will entail serious danger. This is why the matter is of such grave concern to the Security Council. An agreed overall settlement is the only sensible course open to the two communities of Cyprus."

"The elements needed to work out such a settlement are at hand. I am referring, in particular, to the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements in which the two sides agreed on the establishment of a bicommunal and bizonal federation, to the Security Council's resolutions, to the Set of Ideas and to other ideas explored in recent years. It has also been recognized that an overall settlement can best be reached through mutual concessions in comprehensive negotiations between the leaders of the two communities which should continue as long as is necessary to reach agreement. It is now vital that both leaders commit themselves to such a process."

"As leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, you Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have a heavy responsibility to fulfil the aspirations of all Cypriots to a life of peace and prosperity in their country. However, without your full cooperation as well as the active support of Greece and Turkey, our efforts will not succeed."

The S.G. also wrote to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and asked them to support actively his efforts to find an early settlement to the problem of Cyprus.

AN APPEAL BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE S.C.
TO THE TWO LEADERS

The representatives of the five Permanent Members of the S.C. met on April 23, 1997, and considered the problem of Cyprus, and in the communique issued after the meeting, they reaffirmed the unacceptability of the STATUS QUO in Cyprus, and called upon the leaders of the two communities to cooperate fully with the S.G., and to help create a climate of reconciliation and mutual confidence so as to promote the holding of direct negotiations within the next two or three months.

MEASURES TO CREATE A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE
FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS

During the forthcoming discussions, I would suggest that the prospects for a solution would be improved if the two leaders would agree to do what follows, which would create a favorable climate for the negotiations:

(1) The negotiations should not take the form of a "tug-of-war" as if the problem of Cyprus were a "zero-sum game" in which what the one side would gain the other would lose, but in a cooperative spirit in which each side should understand the other side's concerns and try to allay them, and both sides should work out compromise solutions to the outstanding issues which will promote the common interests.

(2) Both sides should agree to reduce military tension and restore mutual confidence, by accepting the above-mentioned repetitive resolutions of the S.C., first, to start reducing the number of foreign troops under the supervision of the UNFICYP and reducing the Republic's defence expenditure, second, by taking the reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines, and third by agreeing to a guaranteed moratorium of overflights of Turkish and Greek military aircraft over Cyprus.

(3) The negotiations should start, not simply from the high-level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 which were abstract guidelines, but from what has been agreed by the one or the other side during the intercommunal negotiations, under the auspices of the S.G. from 1985 to 1992. The following views of the Turkish Permanent Representative at the U.N. Mr. Turkmen, are to the point.

Speaking at the meeting of the S.C. on June 15, 1988, which was discussing the question of the intercommunal negotiations which were to be resumed in September 1988, Mr. Turkmen said the following:

"I wish to note that, regarding most international problems, there are documents which define the framework within which a negotiated settlement can be sought. It is not possible to conceive of a settlement to such problems by discarding these basic documents which are the product of serious and impartial efforts for a peaceful solution".

"Such a document is the 29 March 1986 Draft Framework Agreement ... That document was accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side. It was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side ... This rejection is a problem for the Greek Cypriot side. It does not affect the position of the Turkish Cypriot side or the fact that this document remains on the table. The March document contains and compiles all the points of agreement that had been developed between the two sides through long years of efforts under the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General".

Note: These observations by Mr Tukmen fit very well to the Set of Ideas which we will se below.

WHAT THE TWO SIDES HAD ACCEPTED BEFORE

During the intercommunal negotiations, under the auspices of the S.G., the two sides had accepted certain of the former S.G's, Mr. Perez de Cuellar's, Draft Agreements on Cyprus, which contained many of the provisions of the Set of Ideas. In particular, the Greek Cypriot (G/C) side had accepted the "Draft Statement and Consolidated Draft Agreement" presented by the S.G. in April 1985. The T/C side accepted the "documents" proposed by the S.G. on 17th January 1985 and the "Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus" presented by the S.G. on 29 March 1986.

Obviously, political consistency requires that each side, even if there was a change in its representative, should abide by what it accepted either in these two draft agreements or in the Set of Ideas and the Map in the context of an overall solution.

THE SET OF IDEAS THE BEST BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS

There is no doubt that the best basis for the forthcoming direct negotiations would be the Set of Ideas and the MAP which have been endorsed by the S.G's resolutions 774(1992) and 789(1992) as "the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement". It should be noted that the Set of Ideas incorporate, among other things, the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, and they also bring up-to-date previous resolutions of the S.C. on Cyprus.

THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES ON THE SET OF IDEAS

The S.G's Report of November 19, 1992 (para.9), described the Turkish Cypriot's (T/C's) position on the Set of Ideas as follows:

"In general terms, the T/C side affirmed that it was in `basic agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs' of the Set of Ideas, explaining that the differences under the remaining 9 paragraphs stemmed from the lack of agreement on the following 7 issues: Sovereignty, Presidency, Numerical Equality in the Council of Ministers, The displaced persons, Membership of Cyprus in the European Union, Economic Disparity and Transitional Government".

Recently, however, Mr. Denktash, after a meeting with the S.G. Mr. Kofi Annan, in Geneva, on April 7 1997, stated that "he is ready to begin direct talks with Mr. Clerides on the basis of the Set of Ideas".

According to the same Report (para.9) "the G/C side stated that it accepted the Set of Ideas and the Map, as a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement, subject to `any improvements for the benefit of both communities'". This position of the G/C side was expressed in 1992 by the then President George Vassiliou.

President Glafcos Clerides, however, appears to have certain reservations on the Set of Ideas, but he is willing to discuss these matters during the direct negotiations with Mr. Denktash, under the auspices of the S.G..

The search for a mutually acceptable settlement of the disputed issues will, I believe, be facilitated if the following relevant points would be taken into serious consideration:

THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

With regard to the issue of sovereignty, the Draft Framework Agreement which was accepted by the both sides, provided in para. 1.1(c) (i)that "the Federal Government shall exercise sovereignty in respect of all of the territory". Also the Set of Ideas provided in para. 4 that - "

The overall framework ensures that the Cyprus settlement is based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship".

The G/C side accepted, and continues to accept, wholeheartedly the above provision.

Besides, article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that "all members have equal sovereignty" which implies that each member of the U.N. should have a single sovereignty.

The T/C side, however, although it had accepted the same provision incorporated in the "Draft Framework Agreement" of March 1986, yet, according to the S.G's report of November 19, 1992, it expressed to the S.G. its position, as follows:

"f. The modalities of the implication of the principle of `one sovereignty' for both communities, may be best expressed by the following formula: The federated states are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the sovereignty of the federal State".

It is interesting to note that the last sentence was copied from Article 3 of the Constitution of Switzerland which reads as follows:

"The Cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution and, as such, exercise all rights which are not entrusted to the federal power".

It is clear that Mr. Denktash copied half of Article 3 of the Swiss Constitution but omitted the second half which explains that what is meant by "sovereignty of the Cantons" is that "they exercise all rights which are not entrusted to the federal power".

This omitted provision of the Swiss Constitution coincides with the following provision of the Set of Ideas:

"25 The Federal Government will have the power and functions listed herein.All powers and functions not vested in the Federal Government will rest with the two federated states". The upshot is that -

(a) It is not politically consistent for the T/C side to renege on its acceptance of the above-mentioned provision of the Draft Framework Agreement of March 1986 about single sovereignty.

(b) The provision of the Swiss Constitution about "sovereignty of the Cantons" to which the T/C referred, simply means that the residual powers are conferred to the federated cantons, which is exactly what the Set of Ideas do.

On the other hand, the G/C side is not justified to have any reservations about the "residual powers" being conferred to the Federated States because -

(a) It accepted the same provision which was incorporated in the "Draft Statement of the Consolidated Draft Agreement" of April 1985 and

(b) Since the Set of Ideas specify the powers and functions vested in the Federal Government, the residual powers should ipso facto be vested in the federated states. Similar provisions are made in the Constitutions of all Federal States in the World with the exception of Canada whose Constitution specifies the powers of the Provinces and leaves the residual powers to the Federal Government.

THE EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES

The Set of Ideas provide that there shall be a political equality between the two communities but not on equal participation in all branches and administration of the Federal Government. The same provision was incorporated in the "Draft Framework Agreement" of March 1986 which the Turkish side had accepted.

The Set of Ideas provide that the Council of Ministers shall be composed of G/C and T/C ministers on a 7:3 ratio, provided that the Foreign Affairs shall be allocated to a T/C Minister.

Now Mr. Denktash has reneged on what he accepted in March 1986 and wants equality in the Council of Ministers.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT

The Draft Framework Agreement of March 1986 accepted by Mr. Denktash provided that the President will be a G/C and the Vice-President a T/C.

The Set of Ideas did not take a position on this issue but noted (in para.36) that "the G/C side prefers a system under which the President is elected by popular universal suffrage. The T/C side prefers a system under which the President rotates between the two communities".

During previous negotiations, the G/C side submitted the following proposal:

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by popular universal suffrage and in case a G/C is elected as President, the votes of the G/C's in the election of the Vice-President will count as a percentage equal to the percentage of T/C's who took part in the election of the President. For example if the number of T/C voters who took part in the election of the President was 20% of the total voters, then the weight of the G/C votes in the election of the Vice President will be only 20%, even if the actual number of G/C voters were, for instance, 80%.

The purpose of this proposal was that the G/C voters, being the majority, should not be allowed to elect as Vice-President the candidate they prefer. This is avoided by making their total votes equal to the actual votes of the T/C voters in the election of the President.

I think this way of electing the President and the Vice-President should be considered more democratic than that provided in the Draft Framework Agreement of March 1986 that is, that the President should be elected by the G/C voters and the Vice-President by the T/C voters. Under the proposed system, the votes of the T/Cs will be decisive as to which G/C Presidential candidate will win. It might also be possible for a T/C candidate to be elected as President in case of disputes among the G/C's, as happened in Nicosia in 1908 when, following disputes among G/C Nicosia citizens, a T/C was elected as Mayor of Nicosia.

THE ISSUE OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS (REFUGEES).
HOW THE SEGREGATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES HAS TAKEN PLACE

For ages, and up to 1955, the two communities in Cyprus were living and working peacefully and amicably, together. According to the Official Census of Population of 1946, the T/C's were living, apart from the towns, in 105 purely Turkish villages and in 166 mixed villages, which were, either predominantly G/C villages with a minority of over 5% T/C's or predominantly T/C villages with a minority of over 5% G/C's.

Following, however, the intercommunal violent clashes in 1957 and 1958, the minorities of 64 mixed villages fled and, according to the 1960 Census, the number of mixed villages was reduced to 102.

Furthermore, following the intercommunal violent clashes at the end of 1963 and in the following years, the minorities of another 60 mixed villages fled, and, according to the 1973 Census, the number of mixed villages was reduced to 42 and even there, the Greeks and Turks lived in separate quarters. Finally, after the Turkish invasion in 1974, all the G/C's living in the areas in Northern Cyprus occupied by the turkish forces were forced by iron and fire to flee to the free areas in the South, and all the T/C's have segregated in the North. Thus the two communities segregated and have remained segregated in the past 23 years.

The situation worsened in these 23 years when, after the Turkish invasion, there started an influx of settlers from Anatolia who occupied the empty homes which belonged to the G/C refugees in the North. The number of these Anatolian settlers is now (1997) estimated to be about 80,000. On the other hand, some 30,000 T/C's have been obliged to emigrate and the total number of T/C's which was 116,000 in 1973, is now estimated to have been reduced to about 100,000.

Although the G/C displaced persons want to go back to their homes and property, the T/C's and Anatolian settlers who occupy these houses and property refuse to abandon them and return to their former houses in the G/C Federated zone or to Anatolia.

THE PROPOSALS IN THE SET OF IDEAS

The Set of Ideas proposed to tackle this entangled situation in the following non-compulsory way:

1. Not all G/C refugees who had their homes in the T/C Federated Zone will be allowed to return to their homes, even those who will be allowed to return, will not be allowed to take over their homes, if they are occupied by T/C displaced persons. In this respect, it should be noted that the term "T/C displaced persons" in the Set of Ideas appears to include the Anatolian settlers, as the latter term is not mentioned in it at all.

In such cases, the Set of Ideas propose that the returning G/C displaced persons will be offered other "comparable houses and property" in the T/C Federated Zone. As, however, all houses and property in the T/C Federated Zone are occupied by T/C's and Anatolians, it will be too difficult to carry out that proposal and even if it is carried out, it will create the problem of "mixed villages" which we will see below.

2. With regard to the T/C's and Anatolians who now live in the areas to be given back to the G/C Federated Zone, and who are estimated to amount to about 40,000, the Set of Ideas provide that they will be given the option either to receive other comparable residence and property in the same area or to return to their former residence, or to the T/C Federated Zone.

As, however, many of the T/C or Anatolian farmers who are now living and working in the area to be returned are well-off thanks to the lands they occupy which are irrigated and profitable, it is very likely that a good number of them will opt to stay in the same area and claim comparable residence and land. In such cases, a deadlock will be created because all land in those areas belongs to returning G/C displaced persons who will claim them.

THE DANGER OF RECREATING MIXED VILLAGES

Even if the above-mentioned problems are solved and a number of G/C displaced persons return the T/C Federated Zone, and a number of T/C's remain in the areas to be returned to the G/C Federated Zone, another serious problem will be created - that of recreation of mixed (G/C and T/C) villages.

The G/C's and T/C's who lived in mixed villages in the past were acquainted with one another since childhood, they worked together and had friendly relations, and as fellow-villagers they had common interests. And yet, after the exacerbation of chauvinism on both sides, they clashed and parted.

It seems that the G/C displaced persons who want to return to their villages are under the illusion that, when they return, they will find the same friendly environment as before. In actual fact, however, they will find stranger Turks with whom they will have nothing in common, but, on the contrary, as we have seen above, they will have conflicting property ownership differences. In the circumstances, the danger of intercommunal conflicts will be high.

The exacerbation in recent years of nationalism in the whole world which has led to bloody conflicts between people of different ethnic origins and different religions living in the same areas, as in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, should be a warning to us not to create conditions which may kindle similar conflicts here. The "ethnic cleansing" which has taken place in Yugoslavia in recent years, occurred in Cyprus 23 to 39 years ago, and it would obviously be a folly to try to re-create the previous situation which led to that "ethnic cleansing".

THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP AND THE RIGHT OF THE STATE
TO EXPROPRIATE PROPERTIES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights provides that "no one shall be deprived of his possessions, except in the public interest". 

As we saw above, it is in the public interest to avoid recreation of mixed villages. In the circumstances, I would suggest that the best way to do so, in the public interest, would be to expropriate all G/C properties in the T/C Federated Zone and all T/C properties in the G/C Federated Zone and exchange them between the two Federated Administrations, without any compensation by the one to the other. If this solution is actually agreed by both sides and is incorporated in the final solution, the suggested expropriation should be ratified by the Federal Parliament "in the public interest".

The S.G's Set of Ideas (para. 76, 77) actually provides for a similar exchange between the two communal Agencies which will be established for that purpose. Each Agency will take over the ownership and the titles of all properties belonging to the other community but situated in its own Zone under the Set of Ideas such exchange, however, is restricted to the properties of "persons who seek compensation", only. But as we saw above, even those of the G/C displaced persons who will opt to return to their homes and property in the North, will not be able to take them over and there will be a danger of conflict between the owners and the occupants of the houses and other property.

In the circumstances, in order to avoid such conflicts, it would be in the public interest that the expropriation and exchange should cover all G/C properties in the North and all T/C properties in the South, with the exception of the churches, monasteries and mosques, which should continue to belong to and be maintained by the respective religious authorities, and where religious celebrations will be freely allowed to take place.

After such expropriation, there will be no point for the displaced persons to return to their former houses and property which have been expropriated and for which, as we will see below, they will be compensated.

THE FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT

According to para.49 of the Set of Ideas, after the establishment of the Federal Republic, the freedom of movement will be exercised "without any restrictions subject only to non-discriminatory normal police functions".

With regard to the freedom of settlement, the Set of Ideas provide in para.50 that "the Federated States will regulate the right of settlement in a manner to be agreed upon".

Considering the danger of re-creating mixed villages in the near future, I would suggest that for an interim period of 10 to 15 years, resettlement and purchase of land in the T/C zone by G/C's and in the G/C zone by T/C's should be subject to permits by the host Federated authorities. Thereafter, when the relations between the two communities will, hopefully, become harmonious, all restrictions should be abolished.

NO COMPENSATION BY THE ONE COMMUNITY TO THE OTHER

Another provision of the S.G.'s Set of Ideas (para. 77) is that all titles of properties, owned by displaced persons seeking compensation, "will be exchanged on a global communal basis between the (ad hoc) Agencies of the two communities, at the 1974 value plus inflation". Considering -

(a) that President Vassiliou stated in his speech at the annual meeting of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 16.9.92 that the total value of the G/C properties in the T/C zone in 1974 was estimated at 2 billion cyprus pounds,

(b) that the retail price inflation between 1974 and 1992 was 300% and

(c) that the 1974 value of the T/C properties in the G/C zone is said to be one-eighth that of the G/C (see S.G.'s Report of 21.8.92 para. 32), that will mean that the G/C Agency will claim from the T/C Agency a difference of over(2x3x7:8)5 billion cyprus pounds.

It is quite obvious that such a claim is fantastic and conflicts with the desirability to assist the T/C Community economically to gradually raise its standard of living to that of the G/C Community.

On the other hand, according to the S.G.'s report of 19.11.92 (para.16) Mr Denktash maintains that "the current value of the T/C property left in the South roughly corresponds to that of the G/C property left in the North" and that "the calculation of global compensation will also need to take account of losses and deprivation suffered by the T/C community from 1963 onwards, as well as of funds provided by Turkey to the T/C Community in that period".

In the circumstances, I would suggest, first, that it would be futile to try to assess the values of the respective properties to be exchanged between the two communities and to estimate the claims and counterclaims of the two sides since 1963, which would lead to interminable disputes, and second, that the G/C side should make the generous gesture of goodwill of not claiming any difference from the T/C Community.

COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY

The owners of expropriated property should be compensated by the Authorities of their own community in the same way as provided in the Set of Ideas (para. 77), as follows:

1. From funds obtained from the sale of the expropriated properties of the other community.

2. From savings from defence spending.

3. From the budget of the Federal Republic.

4. From special taxes.

5. From contributions from foreign governments and international organizations.

Of course, the payment of the compensation should be spread over several years.

THE PROBLEM OF THE RELOCATION OF 40,000 TURKS
TO THE NORTH AND THAT OF THE ANATOLIAN SETTLERS

As we saw above, if the Turks now living in the areas that will come under G/C Administration opt to stay there, problems will be created, which may kindle intercommunal conflicts. Therefore, in order to avoid that danger, they should all be relocated to the T/C Federated Zone.

Such relocation, however, will create two serious problems for the T/C community. First, where should the said 40,000 Turks be accommodated, and second, what gainful occupation and property should be given to them.

If new houses are to be built or ruined ones to be repaired for their accommodation, that will not only cost too much but it will also take many years. Finding for them gainful occupation and property comparable to that which they now have, however, will be too difficult, considering that, as the quot;minister" of labour of the unlawful "TRNC" has stated "there are in the `TRNC' 23,000 unemployed and 10,000 clandestine workers from Turkey, who came after the abolition of passports between Turkey and `TRNC'" (see Fileleftheros 5.10.94 quoting "Halkin Sesi").

On the other hand, there is the problem of the Anatolian Settlers who, as we saw above, are estimated to amount to about 80,000, of which, however, probably half of their number has "taken root" in the past 22 years by bearing children, many of which are from T/C mothers.

In the circumstances, I would suggest that these problems could be solved more or less satisfactorily if 40,000 Anatolian settlers (including a number of those who are relocated), who have not "taken root" in Cyprus, would be repatriated to Turkey, with some compensation, and their places be taken, for accommodation, property and work, by 40,000 Turks relocated to the North.

With the repatriation of half of the Anatolian settlers, the problem of the Anatolian settlers will be mitigated.

With such an arrangement it is estimated that, according to the attached Tables, about 48% of the G/C displaced persons will be able to return to their homes and property in the area to be allocated to the G/C Federated Zone, and the other 52% will be compensated as I have just mentioned.

THE ISSUE OF SECURITY

If, as it was suggested above, both sides implement the S.C's resolutions for a considerable reduction of the foreign troops under the supervision of UNFICYP and a reduction of the defence expenditure of the Cyprus Republic, the next steps will be those provided in the Set of Ideas and which are the following:

"56 A numerical balance of Greek and Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the one hand and of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot troops and equipment on the other hand will be achieved within a number of months to be agreed after the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two communities in separate referenda."

"57 A timetable will be established for the further reduction to an agreed level of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot units and for the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces not provided for under the Treaty of Alliance. This timetable will be fully implemented prior to the establishment of the Federal Republicand in phases parallel to the implementation of the programme of action set out in the appendix."

"59 The Federal Republic will maintain a federal force consisting of a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot unit of equal size and equipment not exceeding the size of the Greek and Turkish contingents, under the joint overall command of the president and the vice-president. The Greek Cypriot unit will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot unit will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot Community. The president and the vice-president will jointly decide on the locations of the units."

"60 There will not be any reserve force and any military or paramilitary training of civilian groups."

"66 The United Nations Security Council will be requested to revise the mandate of UNFICYP, including support of the supervision and verification committee."

Furthermore, the two leaders may, during their negotiations, consider either the creation by the U.N. of an international force, or the strengthening of the UNFICYP, in order to supervise the implementation of the agreement to be reached for the solution of the problem of Cyprus.

THE GUARANTEES

The Set of Ideas make the following provisions about the Guarantees:

"54 The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance continue in force and will be supplemented in a document to be appended as set out below."

"55 The Treaty of Guarantee will ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the federal republic and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession; ensure the security of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish federated states; and ensure against the unilateral change of the new constitutional order of the federal republic by either community."

"58 The Treaty of Alliance will provide for the stationing in Cyprus of Greek and Turkish contingents of equal size and equipment not exceeding a number of persons each, to be agreed. The Greek contingent will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community and cannot enter the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish contingent will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community and cannot enter the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community."

"64 The Treaty of Guarantee, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with which the Federal Republic will affirm its commitment, will provide for a supervision and verification committee comprising representatives of the guarantor Powers and of the Federal President and Federal Vice-president. The United Nations will provide the support personnel to assist the supervision and verification committee in carrying out its functions."

The two leaders will have to consider whether the number of Guarantors will be increased and to specify their rights and duties.

THE MEMBERSHIP OF CYPRUS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

In the Set of Ideas (para.92) it is proposed that the question whether the Federal Republic of Cyprus will become a member of the European Economic Community, now European Union (E.U.) should be submitted for approval of the two communities in separate referenda. On this question, I would suggest that consideration should be given to the following probabilities:

(a) If the referenda are held before the solution of the problem of Cyprus, it is very likely that the T/C community will reject such a proposal, in which case the rejection will bind the Federal Republic for the future.

(b) It is very unlikely that Cyprus will be accepted as a member of the E.U. before the Cyprus problem is solved, or very shortly after the Cyprus Federation is established.

(c) It is very unlikely that the T/C community will give up the right of veto it had under article 50 of the Cyprus Republic 1960 Constitution which provided that "The President and the Vice-President, separately or conjointly will have the right of final veto for foreign affairs except the participation of the Republic in iternational organizations in which Greece and Turkey, both participate". Besides, the Set of Ideas lay down in para.40 that "decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs will require the concurrence of both the president and the vice-president" and in para.32 that "a majority of T/C representatives in the Lower House may decide on matters related to foreign affairs that the adoption of a law in the Lower House will require separate majorities of the representatives of both communities".

(d) By the time Cyprus will be accepted as a member of the E.U., it is very likely that the two communities will work under the Federal constitution, harmoniously, and both will see that it will be in their common interest to join the E.U.

Considering all the above, I would suggest that the question whether Cyprus should join the E.U. should be left to be decided by the Federal Government, in accordance with its Constitution, after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Cyprus.

THE ELIMINATION OF ECONOMIC DISPARITY
BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES

As we saw above, one of the issues disputed by Mr. Denktash was the question of elimination of the economic disparity between the two communities. In this respect, the Set of Ideas make the following proposals:

"86 A priority objective of the federal republic will be the development of a balanced economy that will benefit equally both federated states. A major programme of action will be established to correct the economic imbalance and ensure economic equilibrium between the two communities through special measures to promote the development of the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community. A special fund will be established for this purpose. Foreign Governments and international organizations will be invited by the Security Council to contribute to this fund."

"87 To help promote a balanced economy, persons may be employed throughout the federal republic at equal pay."

"88 To protect in particular the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community, special measures and safeguards will be adopted to avoid adverse economic effects resulting from the establishment of the federal republic, for example as a result of the adoption of one currency and the establishment of one customs frontier."

I would suggest that these measures proposed in the Set of Ideas should be considered adequate for the elimination of the economic disparity between the two communities, about which Mr. Denktash is complaining.

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If the two leaders take the measures suggested above for creating a favourable climate for the negotiations and if they follow the advice given to them by the S.G. in his letters to them mentioned at the beginning, it is to be hoped that the forthcoming comprehensive negotiations between the two leaders, under the auspices of the S.G. or his representatives, will continue as long as is necessary to solve, through mutual concessions, all the disputed issues and will ultimately reach a comprehensive settlement of the long-drawn-out problem of Cyprus, so as to avert the serious danger of allowing the precarious STATUS QUO to continue.

TABLE A

INHABITANTS OF THE TOWNS AND VILLAGES
WHICH WILL BE RETURNED TO THE G/C FEDERATED ZONE
ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S "MAP"

(1) As per the 1973 "Micro-Census" of the Statistical Dept. of the Government of Cyprus.

(2) As per the "1978 Agricultural Census" held by the self-styled "Turkish Federated State of

Kibris" published in its 1980 "Demographic Report".

(3) It is assumed that the Varosha area which will be returned to the G/C Federated Zone

will be the same as described in the "Framework for a Cyprus Settlement" proposed in

1978 by the Governments of U.S.A., U.K. and Canada.

(4) Increase at 1.0% per year for 24 years = x 1.270.

TABLE B